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REVISIONISM MISPLACED: WHY TIDS IS 
NOT THE TIME TO BURY AUTONOMY 
David J. Rothman* 
THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDI­
CAL DECISIONS. By Carl E. Schneider. New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press. 1998. Pp. xxii, 307. $39.95. 
For the past twenty years, bioethics has exerted a profound in­
fluence on American medicine. Although its full impact cannot be 
precisely measured, one need only speak to European physicians 
and clinical investigators to grasp the full extent of the change. 
Americans may debate the sufficiency of the information that phy­
sicians share with their patients, but hear a European doctor ex­
claim angrily that it is criminal to ask a woman to decide whether to 
have a radical mastectomy or lumpectomy, and you know that 
bioethics has made a significant difference in the United States. So 
too, Americans, far more intensely than Europeans, will fiercely 
contest any proposed exception to informed consent in research 
protocols, and our Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are un­
matched for the protections they provide human subjects.1 
Not only foreign comparisons but daily events point to the dif­
ference that bioethics has made: consider the newspaper space de­
voted to bioethical considerations, whether the case be multiple 
births, AIDS testing in Africa, cloning, or organ donation, to 
choose recent examples; or the readiness of lawyers to have clients 
sign an advanced directive and proxy assignment; or the intensity of 
public debate on physician-assisted suicide. Bioethics has clearly 
become the stuff of referendum campaigns and dinner-table 
discussions. 
To be sure, bioethics did not enter a vacuum. A powerful tradi­
tion of medical ethics goes back at least as far as Hippocrates.2 But 
the two frameworks are dramatically different. For one, medical 
ethics was internal to the profession - physicians generally wrote 
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1. See THE Erarcs OF REsEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (Harold Y. Vanderpool 
ed., 1996). 
2. See Robert Baker, The History of Medical Ethics, in COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TiiE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 852-57 (W.F. Bynum & R. Porter eds., 1993). 
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and read the salient texts. For another, medical ethics tended to 
focus on doctor-doctor relationships, not doctor-patient relation­
ships. The early professional codes seem more intent on teaching 
etiquette than ethics - the most egregious transgression was to 
steal a colleague's patient. Ethical dilemmas at the bedside were 
resolved by the individual physician with little formal consultation 
with colleagues, let alone patients, and without a written record. 
The physician alone, and on his own, decided whether this case of 
pneumonia was the old man's best friend and should be left un­
treated. Finally, the principle of beneficence underpinned all of 
medical ethics. Physicians' concern for their patients' well-being, 
along with physicians' superior knowledge, rendered them better 
able to decide for patients than the patients themselves. 
Beginning in the 1960s, and with mounting strength thereafter, 
bioethics altered each of these aspects of the tradition of medical 
ethics. Outsiders to medicine - lawyers as well as philosophers -
pronounced on medical decisions, attentive to every nuance of 
practice and ready to tell doctors what to do or not to do. At the 
same time, decisionmaking on ethical issues became collective, evi­
denced by the emergence of IRBs and hospital ethics committees. 
It also became formal, that is, subjected to state and federal regula­
tions and requiring written and signed forms, as in the case of "Do 
Not Resuscitate" orders.3 Perhaps most notably, patient autonomy 
became the guiding principle for decisionmaking. It was the old 
man who was now to decide whether the pneumonia was or was not 
his best friend. In effect, what had once been seen as beneficence 
came to be regarded as paternalism. 
Although few would dispute the accuracy of this general sketch, 
one particular question is now very open to debate: Have Ameri­
cans gone overboard in their dedication to the values of patient au­
tonomy? Restated, have we replaced the tyranny of physician 
beneficence with a tyranny of patient autonomy? Have we let the 
letter of the law override the spirit? In the name of advancing the 
self-determination of patients have we imposed unreasonable and 
ultimately wrongheaded duties and obligations on them? 
This is the central question that Carl Schneider4 addresses in 
The Practice of Autonomy, bringing to bear on it an exceptionally 
wide-ranging knowledge not only of law and bioethics but the social 
sciences as well. He has read widely in the relevant literature and 
comes away persuaded of the limits of the bioethics paradigm both 
in practice and in theory. His book is at once analytic and argu­
mentative, building a case but sprinkling it with deprecatory asides. 
3. See DA YID J. RoTHMAN, STRANGERS AT nm BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAw AND 
BIOETiilCS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 101-246 (1991). 
4. Professor of Law and Internal Medicine, University of Michigan. 
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He announces at the outset that he is writing "against the grain," 
against "conventional bioethics wisdom" (p. xiii), which places ex­
cessive reliance on patient autonomy. He, a self-styled contrarian, 
claims to argue from the patient's point of view and promises to 
move us beyond "present pieties" (p. xiv) by demonstrating that 
patients want both more and less than autonomy. The tone is often 
grating, but the critical question is how well he succeeds. 
Bioethics, Schneider contends, has endowed autonomy with 
such import as to make it "mandatory." Although the principle 
should remain central to medical decisionmaking, it has become 
"wooden," "simplistic," and "extravagant" (p. 33). It presumes a 
"hyper-rational" patient who, in a disembodied, abstract, coldly an­
alytic, and bloodless fashion, calculates the advantages and disad­
vantages of one or another medical strategy, juxtaposes personal 
values against anticipated outcomes, and reaches a decision. But 
such is not the way of patients, Schneider insists. Quoting at length 
from poll data, sociological surveys, and the burgeoning literature 
of patient memoirs, he assembles examples of patients who did not 
want to make their own decisions. These patients, devastated by 
their diseases, sought guidance from doctors, and yes, were ready to 
take their advice on particular decisions. He also describes, in very 
effective fashion, the barriers to giving truly informed consent when 
suffering from major illness, medicated, and lying in a hospital bed. 
Schneider's construction of the hyper-rationalist is familiar -
we have met him before, albeit only in economic texts. There he 
takes the form of "economic man," who maximizes self-interest and 
utility, discounts all present and future benefits against present and 
future costs, and then invests, or expends, in cool and calculating 
fashion. Apparently, the bioethicists have brought him to medicine. 
The Hastings Institute and Georgetown have joined with the 
University of Chicago. 
But the alliance seems illusory, and one wonders whether 
Schneider has invented a straw man. Most of his references to the 
hyper-rationalist, mandatory autonomy position come from would­
be critics, not from advocates. In fact, I myself know of no one who 
pronounces him or herself in favor of such an approach. Thus, Dan 
Brock, who himself favors an "optional" model of autonomy - one 
in which the patient is entitled, but not required, to be active in 
medical decisionmaking - describes a "mandatory model" that 
compels people to make decisions.5 Schneider quotes Brock to 
document the reality of the mandatory autonomy school; Brock, 
however, is staking out a theoretical position, not critiquing an ac­
tual bioethicist. Schneider puts into the "optional" camp such lead-
5. See Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Pa· 
tients, 1 J. KENNEDY INST. ETHICS 28 {1991). 
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ing bioethicists as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and 
includes within it as well the autonomy position set forth by the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems.6 So do 
hyper-rationalists really exist? The individual often invoked by 
Schneider, and this is the book's own distortion, is Jay Katz, a phy­
sician who has taught for many years at Yale Law School. In his 
1984 book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Katz was so 
eager to stimulate_ a dialogue between the two that he did, at times, 
exaggerate the need for patients to serve as decisionmakers.7 But 
Katz, as important as he is, does not constitute a school, let alone a 
movement. Schneider cites still other bioethicists, including Wil­
liam Bartholome and Robert Veatch, but again they seem to be 
more in favor of enhancing patient-doctor dialogue than of saddling 
individual patients with unwanted autonomy.8 
· 
Schneider is no more convincing in identifying instances of 
mandatory autonomy in patient narratives. To buttress his case, he 
tells the story of a patient, Daniel Cohodes, whose doctor 
laid out the facts, shared the research literature, conducted computer 
searches on my behalf, and made certain that I sought appropriate 
outside expertise when necessary. It was painful at times, both for me 
and for him. The result is that I feel and believe that I am a full 
partner in any and all treatment decisions. [p. 15] 
It is difficult, however, to see this as a coercive imposition of 
mandatory autonomy rather than as a wonderful example of a com­
mitted physician trying to educate and empower his patient. 
Indeed, Schneider is so insistent on showing the drawbacks of 
mandatory autonomy that he goes out of his way to illustrate the 
seeming costs of a more general exercise of autonomy; in the pro­
cess, he finds himself in very odd positions. At some points, he 
exaggerates the benefits of trusting doctors. So we learn that we 
often "enlist doctors to help get ourselves to do what we should" (p. 
87). But as an example he cites an author who claims that when 
doctors order patients to stop smoking, "they do so more reliably 
and more comfortably" (p. 87). As anyone familiar with the recidi­
vism rates among smokers knows well, such a claim has the most 
limited validity. Campaigns to stop smoking would be far more ef­
fective if all that was required was a doctor's order. 
6. See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
(3d ed. 1989); PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, REP. No. 46, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 
(1982). 
7. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
8. See William G. Bartholome, A Revolution in Understanding 18 QuALITY REv. BULL. 6, 
10 (1992); Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent, IiAsTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.­
Apr. 1995, at 5, 9. 
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In a similar vein, Schneider devotes considerable space to a cri­
tique of individual independence and a defense of dependence. He 
argues, on the basis of a handful of patient narratives, that individ­
ual independence works to subvert personal intimacy and fosters 
isolation. But there is no necessary connection between wanting to 
share fully in medical decisionmaking and, as Schneider claims, 
foreclosing friendship, forsaking reassurance, and, in a bizarre 
stretch of argument, being unwilling to accept a kidney donation 
from a relative (pp. 163-65). 
Schneider's insistence that contemporary bioethics overburdens 
patients and that consent has turned into a hammer to bludgeon 
patients leads him to contend that we should now back off a dedica­
tion to autonomy in order to correct a deplorable imbalance. But 
without doubting that at times and in places some physicians might 
put too much of an onus on patients, and that some patients may be 
happier leaving decisionmaking to doctors, I cannot think of a 
worse time to retreat from a fundamental emphasis on autonomy. 
There are several reasons why. 
First, the technical expertise of the physician is much greater 
than the patient's knowledge. Despite the world of internet patient 
chat groups, web sites, countless books for every known disease, 
and the weekly edition of the New England Journal of Medicine 
online, the odds remain strong that even well-informed patients will 
still do more listening than dictating. 
Second, although I and many others spend significant hours in 
medical school teaching the need to foster dialogue and work with 
patients to obtain consent, it remains an uphill battle. I know of no 
medical school curriculum in which students spend as much time 
learning how to convey information as how to obtain information. 
The patient interview course is taught from one perspective: how 
to get patients to tell doctors what doctors want to know, not how 
to train doctors to tell patients what patients want to know. 
Third, it is by no means clear what types of medical choices 
drive Schneider's argument. Late in the book, he lays out a grid 
that moves from technical decisions to preferential decisions; he 
also maps types of decisions, from one-time to continuous, and 
from treatment of potentially fatal diseases to ordinary diseases (ch. 
4). He acknowledges the attraction of concluding that patients 
should make value choices and doctors technical choices, but aptly 
recognizes the difficulty - the impossibility - of maintaining the 
distinction in practice. Further, this sophisticated analysis is not 
well integrated into the overall presentation. Nowhere are these 
important differentiations brought to bear directly on the question 
of autonomy and decisionmaking. 
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Nor are we ever certain just how many patients are unhappy 
with the autonomy model, who they are, and how these differences 
should be reconciled. In whose interest are we to make policy? At 
times, Schneider concedes that he is worrying about a minority. At 
other times, it seems that the mandatory autonomy school is tram­
pling over everyone's preferences. He acknowledges that "patients 
largely wish[ ] to be informed about medical circumstances," but "a 
substantial number of them do not want to make their own medical 
decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those decisions" (p. 41). 
Yet, he leaves the reader to parse out what is "largely" versus a 
"substantial number" and how these differences should be 
balanced. 
Schneider does note that decisionmaking preferences vary sig­
nificantly by class, age, and gender. Younger, well-educated women 
are far more likely to want both information and decisionmaking 
responsibility than older men and women with less means and less 
education. He contends, not unreasonably, that older patients mak­
ing life and death choices are least likely to follow an autonomy 
model. But what he does not do is parse out the implications of this 
complexity for policy or education. Do we really want different 
standards of information sharing or consent, one for men and an­
other for women? Or for those above or below 65? Or for those 
with advanced disease as against self-limiting disease? For patients 
with chronic disease as compared to acute disease? How should 
law, bioethics, and medical education differentiate between the 
need to respect the wishes of the young, well-educated woman who 
is determined to make treatment choices for her breast cancer and 
the less well-educated older woman who may want to leave these 
decisions to the surgeon? These are anything but trivial issues, and 
we need more guidance than his critique of mandatory autonomy 
provides. 
Schneider's closing pages on the bureaucratization of medicine 
and the impact of bioethics are limp and unpersuasive. He recog­
nizes that under managed care and team-based medicine, patients 
are losing authority to organizations as well as to physicians (pp. 
186-95). Indeed, physicians are losing authority to the organiza­
tions that employ them, be they hospitals or HMOs. Although in 
his "against the grain" outlook, Schneider is not eager to condemn 
all aspects of bureaucratization, he does acknowledge that medicine 
today has the "impersonality of strangers" (p. 200). Patients and 
doctors do not choose each other, know each other, or stay with 
each other. But, however ready he is to fault bureaucracies for 
these outcomes, he is still more relentless in his critique of 
bioethics. Even more than for-profit managed care companies, it is 
responsible for the quagmire; bioethics ideology, apparently, is 
more powerful than the pocketbook. Because of bioethics' empha-
1518 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1512 
sis on autonomy and information sharing, it has seemingly become 
"easier for doctors to distance themselves from patients and to shed 
the psychic and moral burdens" that physicians once assumed (p. 
205). Surely the indictment is exaggerated and is based on no more 
than a few anecdotes. In all events, Schneider and his readers are 
still left with the dilemma of how to proceed. Is this the time to 
abandon or reinvigorate principles of autonomy? 
Schneider, ready to abandon them, looks for alternative answers 
in two distinct arenas. First, he champions the idea of guidelines. If 
only we had clear standards, in his examples, that emphasized the 
need for pain relief, for medical screening, and for end-of-life care, 
then doctors would know better what to do; further, patients would 
have valuable reference points that would reduce the burdens of 
choice. But Schneider forgoes a discussion of who is to compose 
the guidelines; surely HMOs, medical organizations, physician spe­
cialists, and consumer groups would be likely to provide very differ­
ent content. Nor does he address whether guidelines would be 
effective in this new era. There is good reason to think not. After 
all, there are already existing guidelines on pain relief but no 
palliative-care specialist I know believes that they are being fol­
lowed.9 And the same could be said of guidelines on medical 
screening and end-of-life decisions. 
Rather than contend with these issues, Schneider closes his 
book with ten rules that are intended to enhance the place of kind­
ness within medicine. Almost all of them, however, involve medical 
etiquette and not medical ethics. We have come full circle, with 
Schneider relying on manners rather than addressing power. Rule 
1 for doctors: do not keep people waiting. Rule 2: respect privacy. 
Rule 3: introduce yourself to strangers. Rule 4: grant other adults 
the same courtesy in titles you accord yourself. His rules go on to 
urge saying "please" and "thank-you" and returning your phone 
calls (pp. 221-26). 
Confronting the enlarged authority of managed care corpora­
tions that take their messages from their corporate clients, share­
holders, and cost-conscious government officials (as in managed 
Medicare and Medicaid), no advocate for patient well-being can be 
confident of which protests or reform strategies will work best. 
These are times that make the most avid proponent of rights hum­
ble. After confronting a critique like Schneider's and reckoning 
with his solutions, pondering the arguments against autonomy and 
the potential of good manners to change structure, I, for one, am 
more prepared to invest in a rights-oriented movement, in patient 
and consumer proactivity and not dependence, and in patient au-
9. See INSTITUTE OF MEo., APPROACHING DEATII: IMPROVING CARE AT TIIE END OF 
LIFE 335 (1997). 
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tonomy, albeit optional rather than mandated. When physicians 
must see patients on a ten-minute schedule, and when financial con­
flict of interest is more acute now in medicine than ever before, I do 
not think it wise, in individual or policy terms, to worry about an 
excess of reliance on patient decisionmaking. Indeed, I cannot 
think of a worse time to champion the idea of passive patients. 
It is not just managed care but the intrinsic character of medical 
progress that makes me so critical of Schneider's approach. There 
is every reason to assume that trade-offs in medical decisions are 
going to become more weighty than before. In almost all arenas, 
the progress in technique, skill, and capacity grows exponentially, 
both in terms of diagnostics and treatment. How far down the diag­
nostic road do we as individuals want to travel? As the power of 
genetic tools becomes greater - encompassing not only compara­
tively rare cases of fatal diseases such as Huntington's, but the more 
common cases of breast cancer, to say nothing of future capacities 
to diagnose heart disease, hypertension, or obesity - is the first 
and most critical message to patients to trust the genetic specialists? 
Is this truly the moment to worry about the perils of over-informing 
patients? With therapeutic interventions becoming more powerful, 
with transplant surgery long having broken the fifty-year-old bar­
rier, with responsible surgeons ready to perform cardiac bypass or 
hip replacement surgery on men and women in their nineties, is the 
vital message to transmit one of excessive patient commitment to 
autonomy? 
To put it most bluntly, Schneider's book is not one I would rush 
to put in an elder hostel or medical school curriculum, or give to 
legislators to ponder. Yes, some bioethicists should read it to make 
certain their normative statements on doctor-patient relationships 
are not exaggerated, and sociologists will profit from its intelligent 
discussion of the patient literature. But I think we need more, not 
fewer, books that instruct us carefully and precisely on how to pro­
tect and assert our own values and interests in the doctor's office. 
